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ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure,

Appellant

and Defendant

Images

& Attitude, Inc.

("Images") respectfully submits this Reply Brief of Appellant to
address new matters set forth in Macris & Associates, Inc.'s
("Macris & Associates") Brief of Appellee.

Macris & Associates

advances many arguments in defense of Images' appeal; however,
Images asserts that the two issues addressed herein are dispositive
of Images' appeal.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.
This Court will recall that in Images' Brief of Appel-

lant, Images asserted that the trial court erred in dismissing
Images' claim for fraudulent inducement on the basis of collateral
estoppel, a branch of the doctrine of res judicata.1

Images

asserts that the trial court's application of collateral estoppel
constitutes plain error since Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Macris &
Associates") failed to meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the issues in the prior arbitration were
identical and that the prior arbitration fully and fairly litigated
the issue of fraudulent inducement between Images and Macris &
Associates.

The trial court's error also constituted plain error

Collateral estoppel ijs a branch of the doctrine of res judicata. Rinqwood
v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah App. 1990); Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1374 n.
5 (Utah 1988); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451,
453 (Utah App. 1988); Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1987); Cf.
Brief of Appellee at 1, n.2.
REPLY BRF (AN/MACRIS)

for the reasons that the issues in the prior arbitration were not
identical to the issues presented in the instant action and Images
did not have any opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the question of whether Images was fraudulently induced into the contract
with Macris & Associates in the arbitration action between Images
and Affinity.
A.

Macris & Associates Utterly Failed In Meeting Its
Burden Of Establishing The Applicability Of The
Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel Below.

The party raising the defense of collateral estoppel has
the burden of proving the applicability of the doctrine.
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993).

Timm v.

In requesting summary

judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel, Macris & Associates
utterly failed in its burden of establishing that the issues in the
two actions were identical and had been fairly and fully litigated.
Macris & Associates merely presented a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Macris & Associates, Inc.'s and Mike Macris'
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Fraudulent Inducement to the trial
court wherein Macris & Associates alleged that the issues were
identical and had been fully and fairly litigated (R. 1181-91) .
However, Macris & Associates presented absolutely no evidence to
support its bare allegations.

Macris & Associates presented no

affidavits in support of the supplemental memorandum, offered no
transcriptions of the arbitration hearing, and attached no part of

REPLY BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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the record in the arbitration proceedings. Macris & Associates did
not even submit the Arbiter's Order!2
In contrast, Images presented evidence in the form of
affidavit testimony demonstrating that at a minimum questions of
material fact existed with respect to Images' claim against Macris
& Associates. The Affidavit of Tom Mower, dated September 9, 1993
(R. 1043-48) set forth material facts which supported Images' claim
that Images was fraudulently induced by Macris & Associates into
entering into the contract with Macris & Associates including the
fact that Macris & Associates made certain representations to
Images and that Images reasonably relied upon those representations
in entering into the contract with Macris & Associates. (See also
Images' Memorandum In Opposition to Macris & Associates, Inc.'s
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Fraudulent Inducement, R. 9871017).

Clearly, where Macris & Associates failed to present any

evidence of the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and where Images presented evidence demonstrating material
issues of fact concerning Images' claim for fraudulent inducement,
it was error for the trial court to dismiss Images' claim for
fraudulent inducement on the basis of collateral estoppel.

2
Rather, it was Images who presented the trial court with the Order as an
exhibit to Images' memorandum in opposition to Macris & Associates's supplemental
memorandum. The Order did not contain findings of fact which was crucial to an
order of Summary Judgment.

REPLY BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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B.

The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Clearly Did Not
Apply to Images' Claim for Fraudulent Inducement
Against Macris & Associates.

Macris & Associates, Inc.'s argument concerning collateral estoppel completely ignores one fundamental distinction which
entirely affects the analysis employed by the trial court and by
Macris & Associates on appeal.

The distinction is that in the

arbitration proceeding, the parties to that arbitration proceeding
were Images and Affinity, not Macris & Associates.

Accordingly,

the contract between Images and Macris & Associates could not have
been fully and fairly litigated.

This one obvious fact alone ren-

ders irrelevant Macris & Associates' entire argument contained in
the Brief of Appellee.
The following illustration, though unsophisticated, amply
demonstrates the fallaciousness of Macris & Associates' argument:
Suppose A is hit in the back of the head with a hard
object. When A regains consciousness, he sees B and C
standing above him, each with a slingshot in one hand and
a pile of rocks in the other. A sustains severe injuries
as a result of the incident. A brings a civil action
against B for battery to recover damages resulting from
being hit in the head with a rock. Upon a motion for
summary judgment, the trial court specifically finds that
"A was not injured by being hit in the head by a rock
thrown by B.ff A then brings a civil action against C to
recover damages resulting from being hit in the head with
a rock by C.
If the trial court in the action against C in the above
illustration employed Macris & Associates' analysis as contained in
Section I.B.4. of the Brief of Appellee, the trial court could find
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred A's action against
C because the trial court in the earlier action made a finding that
REPLY.BRF (AN/MACRJS)
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A had not been hit in the head!

Clearly, the application of the

doctrine of collateral estoppel would be improper in this instance.
Likewise, collateral estoppel was improperly applied in
the instant case. The earlier arbitration involved Images' claims
against Affinity for allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations made
by Affinity which induced Images into entering into a contract with
Affinity.

Macris & Associates was not a party to the arbitration

proceedings.

Accordingly, Images' contract with Macris & Associ-

ates was not at issue in the earlier arbitration proceeding.

The

doctrine of res judicata, of which collateral estoppel is a branch,
is designed to preclude issues which either were litigated in a
prior action, or could have or should have been litigated in a
prior action. Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677
(Utah App. 1994); Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250,
254 n.6 (Utah App. 1993); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247
(Utah 1988) . Here, Images claims against Macris & Associates were
not litigated in the arbitration, nor could they or should they
have been litigated in the arbitration proceeding.

Accordingly,

the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar
Images' claim for fraudulent misrepresentation against Macris &
Associates was improper.
Macris & Associates' analysis of the difference between
"ultimate issues" and "evidentiary facts", though impressive, has
absolutely no bearing to the issue of whether the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

In the

sources cited by Macris & Associates to support its position, inREPLY.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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eluding the Restatement illustration, the courts dealt with either
the same parties in the prior and later actions or the same ultimate issues (Brief of Appellee at 25-29).

Restatement (Second) of

Judgments § 27 comment c, illustration 4 (1982) (dealt with A and
B in both actions); In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 427 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. 111. 1977) (shareholders sued same
companies in both actions; Yamaha Corp. of America v. U.S., 961
F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Yamaha-America' s rights under section
526 of the Tariff Act were litigated in prior and later actions);
Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp., 496 F.2d 230, 235 (6th
Cir. 1974) ("the unlawful aspects of the license agreement between
Sun and Presform" were at issue in both actions.); Temple of the
Lost Sheep, Inc. v. Abrams, 930 F.2d 178, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1991)
(identical Section 19 83 claims were litigated in both actions); and
Jones v. United States, 466 F.2d 131, 136 (10th Cir. 1972) (tax
treatment for payments received pursuant to the same contract at
issue in both cases).
Conversely, the present action included Images' claims
against Macris & Associates relative to the contract between Images
and Macris & Associates, whereas the prior arbitration dealt with
Images' claims against Affinity relative to a completely different
contract between Images and Affinity. While the two cases may have
had "evidentiary facts" in common, i.e. certain statements made by

REPLY BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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Michael Macris, an agent of Affinity and Macris & Associates,3 the
"ultimate issues" were different.

One simply cannot separate the

cause of action for fraudulent inducement from its elements. The
fact that different contracts and different companies were involved
are more than mere evidentiary facts but rather affect the ultimate
issue.

Simply because the arbiter found that Images had not been

fraudulently induced into the contract with Affinity has no bearing
upon whether Images was fraudulently induced into the contract with
Macris & Associates.

To hold otherwise would be akin to holding

that since A was not hit in the head by a rock thrown by B, then A
was not hit in the head by a rock thrown by C.

(See illustration

supra.)
C.

The Trial Court Committed Plain Error in Dismissing
Images' Claim for Fraudulent Inducement.

The trial court's error in dismissing Images' claim
against Macris & Associates for fraudulent inducement rises to the
magnitude of plain error.

This Court has defined plain error as

follows:
The f i r s t requirement for a finding of p l a i n e r r o r i s
t h a t the e r r o r be " p l a i n , " i . e . , from our examination of
the record, we must be able to say t h a t i t should have
been obvious to a t r i a l court t h a t i t was committing
e r r o r . . . . The second and somewhat i n t e r r e l a t e d r e quirement for a finding of p l a i n e r r o r i s t h a t the e r r o r

3

As set forth e a r l i e r , Macris & Associates completely failed to c i t e to
portions of the record below to demonstrate that Macris & Associates ever
established which factual issues were found in the prior a r b i t r a t i o n and which
factual issues were binding upon Images. Moreover, misrepresentations concerning
such factual issues as the advertising may not have been material to Images's
contract with Affinity, but would, however, be very material to Images's contract
with Macris & Associates.
REPLY BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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affect the substantial rights of [a party], i.e., that
the error be harmful.
Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 892 (Utah App.
1995) .

Images asserts that it should have been obvious to the

trial court that it was committing error when it misapplied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.

This is particularly true where

Images' claims in each action were against different companies as
a result of separate contracts.
Clearly, the second requirement for finding plain error
is likewise met in this case.

The substantial rights of Images

were obviously effected by the denial of its claim for fraudulent
inducement.

Had Images been allowed to present evidence of its

fraudulent inducement claim, the trial court could have invalidated
the entire contract resulting in no liability on the part of
Images.

Instead, the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine

of collateral estoppel and dismissed Images' meritorious cause of
action.
Since the trial court committed plain error in applying
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, it is immaterial whether
Images asserted, for the first time on appeal, that the claims in
the two actions were not identical. Utah appellate courts consider
plain error even where raised for the first time on appeal. State
v. Irwin, 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah App. Sept. 6, 1996);
State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, (Utah 1996); Berenda v. Lancrford,
914 P.2d 45, 51, (Utah 1996); State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247
(Utah App. 1996); Davis, 905 P.2d at 892 (Utah App. 1995). Conse-

REPLY.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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quently, it is proper for this Court to review all aspects of the
trial court's application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
for plain error despite Macris & Associates' protestations to the
contrary.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MICHAEL
MACRIS WAS NOT THE AGENT OF MACRIS & ASSOCIATES AND
THAT MACRIS & ASSOCIATES WAS NOT THE ALTER EGO OF
MICHAEL MACRIS.
A.

Images Has Sufficiently Marshalled The Evidence In
Support Of The Trial Court's Findings Of Fact.

Macris & Associates begins its attack on Images' alter
ego claim by asserting that Images failed to sufficiently marshal
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings that the
actions of Michael Macris were not attributable to Macris & Associates and that Macris & Associates was not the alter ego of Michael
Macris.

To support its insufficient marshalling argument, Macris

& Associates purports to offer a summary of evidence supporting the
trial court's findings.

(Brief of Appellee at 34-36).

Macris &

Associates' summary is, at best, disingenuous.
For instance, Macris & Associates stated in the Brief of
Appellee:
10.

Others testified that they knew Mike Macris operated his distributorship through Macris & Associates,
Inc., and separated his other companies and their
duties. (See, e.g., Marge Aliparandi [sic] testimony, R. 4745.)

(Brief of Appellee at 37) . This statement is a deliberate misrepresentation of the record below.

At trial, Margie Aliprandi was

asked by counsel for Macris & Associates: "Do you know whether
REPLY.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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Macris & Associates was a distributorship with any multi-level
marketing company?" (R. 4745).

In answer to this question, Margie

Aliprandi responded: "He was my sponsor."

This answer actually

indicates that the distinction between Michael Macris and Macris &
Associates was blurred for at least Margie Aliprandi. Moreover, as
set forth in Images' Brief of Appellant, every witness, other than
the Macrises themselves, testified that they did not understand the
relationship between Michael Macris and his various companies.
(See Brief of Appellant at 27-29).
The other so-called examples of insufficient marshalling
cited by Macris & Associates are simply immaterial and do not necessarily support the trial court's findings of fact. Images does
not dispute that Michael Macris held himself out as the President
of Macris & Associates or that Macris & Associates was a corporation.

(See Brief of Appellee at 36-37, %'s 2, 3, 7). Nor does

Images dispute that Macris & Associates kept some corporate records.

(See Brief of Appellee at 36-37, <H's 8-9). However, these

factors do not necessarily support a finding that Macris & Associates was a separate and distinct entity. Any charlatan wishing to
avoid liability for wrongdoing by hiding behind the facade of a
corporation would take at least these steps to create the appearance of a separate and distinct corporation.

While this evidence

may support the trial court's findings of fact, they are insignificant in comparison to the overwhelming evidence suggesting that
Michael Macris was acting as the agent for Macris & Associates when
he engaged in competitive activities and that Macris & Associates
REPLY BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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was the alter ego of Michael Macris.

The evidence propounded by

Macris & Associates is "insufficient to support the findings
against [Images'] attack."

State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545,

548 (Utah 1996).
Macris

& Associates' other evidentiary

simply irrelevant.

examples are

The evidence propounded in Paragraphs 1, 4, 5

and 6 of Macris & Associates' brief are merely actions taken by Tom
Mower and/or Images; none of which constitutes evidence of Michael
Macris' actions or the actions of Macris & Associates. (See Brief
of Appellee at 36-37) . Macris & Associates' inability to propound
concrete and sound examples to support its argument for insufficient marshalling only shows that the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings was weak.

Images fulfilled its obligation to

marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of
fact.

Images further demonstrated that the marshalled evidence is

insufficient to support those findings. State v. Higginbotham, 917
at 548; State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990).
For instance, the evidence presented to the trial court
demonstrated that the Images distributors with whom Michael Macris
worked closely were unaware of any distinct corporate existence of
Macris & Associates, or that Michael Macris was merely an employee
of that corporation. (R. 4732-34, 4749, 5591, 5594, 5596 and 5615).
Moreover, Michael Macris continued to work in the same representative capacity for Macris & Associates even after he had resigned as
President of Macris & Associates. He continued to communicate with
Images on behalf of Macris & Associates, through counsel (Trial
REPLY.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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Exhibit 9, 39, 54); he continued to write checks on behalf of
Macris & Associates

(R. 5505); and he represented himself as

President of Macris & Associates even when he was no longer an
officer (R. 5540) . Finally, even Valerie Macris acknowledged that
Macris & Associates did not always adhere to corporate formalities
(R. 5125) .
There was never any meaningful distinction between Michael
Macris and Macris & Associates.

Rather Michael Macris used the

corporate shell to shield himself from liability for engaging in
competitive activities while reaping the rewards of his contract
between Images and Macris & Associates.
injustice and inequity to Images.

Such conduct resulted in

The evidence presented to the

trial court and to this Court overwhelmingly supports Images'
position that the trial court erred in making its findings of fact.
B.

Michael Macris And Macris & Associates Engaged In
Disruptive And Competitive Activities.

In Section II.D. of the Brief of Appellee, Macris & Associates claims that the alleged competitive activities of Macris
took place after Images allegedly breached the contract with Macris
& Associates, and therefore, Macris was not contractually restricted from competing with Images. (Brief of Appellee).

This position

completely ignores the substantial evidence presented at trial that
Michael Macris was testing and distributing nail gel products not
endorsed by Images which Michael Macris manufactured for his com-

REPLY.BRF (AN/MACR1S)
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panies, Affinity and American Polymer4, to Images distributors long
before Images allegedly breached the contract with Macris & Associates (R. 4681, 4683, 4774, 4845).

The policies and procedures of

Images proscribed conduct which "may cause loss to the Company or
to another Images Distributor."

(Trial Exhibit 83 at 7). 5 By

testing unendorsed nail gels, Michael Macris was furthering the
business

of his other companies

in competition with Images.

Michael Macris was also known to the Images distributors as their
"upline."
Macris & Associates apparently believes that the only competitive actions of Michael Macris at issue at trial were those
activities he engaged in while creating Emily Rose, which according
to Macris & Associates, occurred after the alleged breach by
Images. (Brief of Appellee at 41).

This position is erroneous,

however, in view of the substantial evidence which suggested that
Michael Macris was supplying unendorsed nail gels to Images distributors prior to the alleged breach by Images (Brief of Appellant
at 25-30).
Separating the actions of Michael Macris on behalf of himself, Macris & Associates, Affinity, American Polymer and Emily
Rose, was the only way the trial court could rationalize its find-

4
American Polymer manufactured nail gels for companies other than Images.
Therefore, American Polymer was in competition with Images, and Michael Macris,
acting as an agent for American Polymer, furthered such competition.
5

The Code of Ethics contained in the Images Policies and Procedures also
forbade the "use of the company name, information, literature, gatherings,
people, or other Images resources to further other business interests." (Trial
Exhibit 83 at 7) (emphasis added).
REPLY BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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ing that Images breached the Agreement with Macris & Associates
first. However, separating Michael Macris' actions in dealing with
distributors of Images from Macris' role as President of the upline
Images' distributorship simply makes no sense and is absolutely
contrary to the evidence presented at trial.

(See Brief of

Appellant at 25-30).
A president of a corporate distributorship, working within the scope of his employment as president of the corporate distributorship is an agent of that corporate distributorship whether
the president claims he is or not. Horrocks v. Westfalia, 892 P.2d
14 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 119
U.S. 99, 104, 7 S.Ct. 118, 121 (1886) ("The acts of an agent, within the scope of the authority delegated to him, are deemed the acts
of the principal. Whatever he does in the lawful exercise of that
authority is imputable to the principal . . . . ")) . "Even when the
agent is acting adversely to the principal's interest, the knowledge

of

the agent may

still be

imputed

to

the principal."

Horrocks, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah App. 1995).
Clearly, when Michael Macris was providing unendorsed
gels to Images distributors, his actions should be imputed to his
employer Macris & Associates, even if he was ostensibly supplying
those gels for testing for a competing company he owned.

It was

error for the trial court to find otherwise, especially in light of
the substantial evidence presented at trial.
Even though Images specifically objects to twelve of the
factual findings, those factual findings impacted the entire outREPLY BRF (AN/MACR1S)
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come of the litigation.

For instance, if the trial court had cor-

rectly found that Michael Macris was acting as an agent of Macris
& Associates when he supplied unendorsed nail gels to Images distributors for testing, then the trial court would have properly
found that such conduct constituted a material breach of the Agreement between Images and Macris & Associates. Images, accordingly,
would have had no further obligation under the Agreement.
Furthermore, if the trial court had properly found that
Macris & Associates was the alter ego of Michael Macris, then
Michael Macris' improper conduct would likewise constituted the
first material breach of the Agreement.
Ample evidence was presented to the trial court and to
this Court (See Brief of Appellant) of Macris' improper conduct.
This evidence, taken together, overwhelmingly established that
Michael Macris used the shell of Macris & Associates to shield himself from the consequences of his improper conduct in creating competing companies while contractually obligated to Images.

The

trial court's observance of the form of Macris & Associates did indeed "sanction a fraud, promote injustice and result in inequity.
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 499 (Utah App. 1994).
These findings were clearly erroneous and should be overturned.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order and Judgment entered by
the Third District Court and remand the case to the Third District
REPLY BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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Court for entry of an Order in favor of Images, no cause of action,
or in the alternative for a new trial on the issues of fraudulent
inducement, breach of contract and alter ego as asserted in Images'
affirmative defenses contained in Images' Amended Counterclaim.
DATED this
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